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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 2011, the Supreme Court of Florida made a final decision
on Jardines v. State (Jardines III),' ending an issue split in the Florida Dis-
* Abigail Brown will receive her J.D. from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center, in May 2013. Abigail received a Bachelor's of Science from the Universi-
ty of Iowa, with a major in political science, emphasizing on pre-law. Abigail would like to
thank the office of the Coral Springs City Attorney and her fellow interns, for sparking and
fueling the idea and desire to write this article. She would also like to thank the entire staff of
Nova Law Review for their dedication and skill in editing this article, as well as her amazing
new friends here at Nova Southeastern University for their laughter and kindness. Most im-
portantly, Abigail would like to thank her mother and father for always being there for her and
her husband for his continuing love and support-without him, she would be missing the best
part of herself.
1. 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
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trict Courts of Appeal. 2 Jardines III stemmed from an appeal by the defen-
dant seeking to quash evidence that was seized due to a search warrant.3 In
its holding, the court held that, contrary to other decisions by the First and
Third District Courts of Appeal of Florida, a "sniff test" conducted at the
front door of a home is a search that is protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment.4 In order for the test to be conducted, probable cause-and not rea-
sonable suspicion-must be met for any search to be constitutional.
In the lower court decision by the Third District Court of Appeal, which
was overturned by the Supreme Court of Florida, the court held that a person
does not have a right of privacy involving contraband, and therefore, a "sniff
test" does not fall under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 6 The split
had been created between the third district and the fourth district, which
found in State v. Rabb (Rabb II)' that a "sniff test" is a search under the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.8 However, the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed and remanded Rabb II back to the fourth district in
light of its decision in Illinois v. Caballes.'o In its holding in Caballes, the
Supreme Court stated that during a lawful traffic stop, the use of a narcotics-
detection dog is not a search under the Fourth Amendment when conducted
by a newly arrived officer to the scene." This case was part of a line of deci-
sions by the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the use of a nar-
cotics dog to sniff out narcotics is not a search under the Fourth Amendment
because a person has no legitimate privacy interest in contraband.12
At the same time, in some lower courts' eyes, there have been decisions
by the Supreme Court of the United States that have created a different im-
pression of a dog sniff test, especially of a private residence from the front
step.13 In particular, the key decision of Kyllo v. United States 4 has been
seen by lower courts as a reinforcement of the protection of the inside of a
2. Id. at SI 47.
3. Id.
4. Id. at S147, S148 n.3.
5. Id. at SI47.
6. See State v. Jardines (Jardines 1), 9 So. 3d 1, 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review
granted, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009), and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
7. 920 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
8. Id. at 192; see also Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 10.
9. Florida v. Rabb (Rabb 1), 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005), substituted by, 920 So. 2d
1175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
10. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
11. Id.at410.
12. Id. at 409 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
13. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1182-83 (interpreting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-
31 (2001)).
14. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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home from arbitrary government intrusion." However, the Supreme Court
of the United States distinguished Caballes from Kyllo, which has caused
many lower courts to come to completely different conclusions on a dog
sniff of a private residence, including the different appellate courts of Flori-
da.16
This article will first discuss the cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States that evolved the law of the Fourth Amendment and the
legality of a dog sniff for contraband. The next section will analyze the dif-
ferent decisions by the appellate courts in Florida on whether a dog sniff is a
search under the Fourth Amendment. The third section will dissect the deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Florida that ended the district court split. Fi-
nally, the last section will explain why this is probably not in accord with
what the Supreme Court of the United States would decide if and when the
Court finally accepts a case involving a dog sniff of a private residence from
the front step.
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The decisions by the highest court of the United States have had an im-
pact on the diverging results of lower courts on the issue of a dog sniff of a
private residence from the front step of the home." The Supreme Court of
the United States has only addressed the issue of a dog sniff of areas not in-
volving the home.' 8 Because of this, when resolving the issue of a dog sniff
of a private residence, lower courts have combined the holdings of multiple
cases in order to formulate specific rules for these new cases.'
A. Initial Fourth Amendment Cases
Before Katz v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court of the United States
used a trespass theory to decide if a person's rights under the Fourth
Amendment had been violated. 2' The Court would ask if an individual's
15. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1182-83 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-31).
16. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10; Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 10.
17. See Jardines I, 9 So. 3d at 10.
18. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
19. See Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1183-85.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), superseded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
21. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REv. 299, 304 (2010).
203
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person, papers, house or effects had been physically invaded.22 In Olmstead
v. United States, 23 the Court addressed the issue of "whether the use of evi-
dence of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others,
intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth .
. . Amendment[]." 24 The Court focused on how the Fourth Amendment spe-
cifically mentions only "material things," and therefore, the wiretapping was
not a search because it only involved use of the senses to detect a non-
material item.25
"In Katz, the Supreme Court overruled the trespass theory and replaced
it with the reasonable expectation of privacy theory."26 The majority focused
on the idea that the Fourth Amendment does not create "constitutionally pro-
tected area[s]- . the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."27
However, it was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz that created the
presently used test for Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.28 The test
has a two-fold requirement: First, the person needs to have shown an actual
and subjective expectation of privacy, and second, this expectation must be
recognized as reasonable by society. 29 This two-fold test has been asked in
the shorthand: "Did the defendant have a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy?"30 One of the unusual times in which the Court has considered whether
an action is a search under the Fourth Amendment is when a dog sniff was
used to detect for narcotics.
B. Supreme Court Cases Relied Upon by Lower Courts
1. First Dog Sniff Case
The Court first addressed the issue of a dog sniff as a search in United
States v. Place.32 "[The] Court addressed the issue of whether police, based
on reasonable suspicion, could temporarily seize a piece of luggage at an
22. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
24. Id. at 455.
25. Id. at 464.
26. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 304.
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
28. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 307-08.
31. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
32. 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
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airport and then subject the luggage to a 'sniff test' by a drug detection
dog."33 In Place, federal agents met the defendant at the La Guardia Airport
on information they received from the Miami police. 34 However, upon the
request for his luggage, Place refused the search.35 Still, the agents retrieved
the bags from him and told him they would obtain a search warrant for the
luggage. 36 The agents held the bags for ninety minutes as they drove to
another airport for a drug detection dog to sniff the luggage, which alerted
the dog positively to the presence of narcotics." On Monday, the agents
received a probable cause warrant to open and physically search the lug-
gage.38 The Court held the retention of the luggage for ninety minutes was
impermissibly long.39
However, the Court went further and analyzed the dog sniff of the lug-
gage in dicta.40 In her article, Leslie Lunney points out that Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion gives a two paragraph citation-less statement
saying, a dog sniff of the luggage did not reveal non-contraband items to the
public. 4 ' This is the first time the Court used the phrase sui generis to de-
scribe a dog sniff.42 The Court stated a dog sniff is sui generis because it "is
so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained" and the
manner in which the information is revealed.4 3 According to Timothy Mac-
Donnell, this dictum carved out the "contraband exception" to the Fourth
Amendment, which is also known as the binary search doctrine." These
names refer to the Court's reasoning that the dog sniff only reveals the pos-
session of contraband and therefore does not violate any legitimate privacy
interest. 45 Since the Supreme Court of the United States related in dicta the
nature of a dog sniff, lower courts have been using this reasoning that a dog
sniff is per se a non-search.46
33. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S148 (Apr. 14,2011).
34. Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
35. Id. at 699.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
40. See id. at 707 (dictum).
41. Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable
Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REv. 829, 844
(2009).
42. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
43. Id.
44. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 302.
45. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
46. Lunney, supra note 41, at 831.
205
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2. The Illegitimacy of Contraband
In 1984, the Supreme Court of the United States further addressed the
illegitimacy of an interest in contraband.47 Employees of a freight carrier
discovered a suspicious white powder in a damaged package.48 While United
States v. Jacobsen49 did not involve the use of a narcotics dog to reveal the
presence of contraband, the Court affirmed this thinking by holding that a
chemical field test is not a search because there is no legitimate private inter-
est in contraband.o The Court explained by stating, "Congress has de-
cided-and there is no question about its power to do so-to treat the interest
in 'privately' possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'pri-
vate' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.""1 Since there is no
legitimate interest in cocaine, there was no legitimate interest in privacy
compromised. 52 However, not every Justice agreed with this holding.53 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated, "we have always looked to the
context in which an item is concealed, not to the identity of the concealed
item."54 Yet, the majority's reasoning of an illegitimate interest in contra-
band still remains in effect today.
3. The Privacy of the Home
Another more recent decision that has centered on the possible illegiti-
macy of contraband is Kyllo. The Court addressed the issue of "whether
the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public
street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."5 7 The Court ans-
wered by holding that, "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that
is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would pre-
viously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is
47. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
48. Id. at 111.
49. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
50. See id. at 123.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 133-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
56. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
57. Id.
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a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."18 In Kyllo,
a federal agent came to suspect that the respondent was using his house to
grow marijuana, and to determine this, the agent used a thermal imager to
scan the home of the respondent. 9 The scan "took only a few minutes and
was performed from [a car] across the street."' The majority opinion, writ-
ten by Justice Scalia, gave an extensive discussion of the special nature of
the home afforded by the Constitution.6 1 "'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' 62 Justice Scalia noted
that with very few exceptions, the warrantless search of a home is unconsti-
tutional.63 He stated, "[w]e have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a
firm line at the entrance to the house.'"" The "scan was a 'search' because it
made technology-assisted inferencing about the interior of a home possi-
ble." 65 However, the dissent did not believe that intimate details were stolen
from the home.66
Justice Stevens began by reminding the Court that it held .'.[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public' is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 67  For a simpler argument, he pointed out that the Fourth
Amendment states, "'secure in their. . . houses."' 68
Just as "the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their
eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been ob-
served by any member of the public," so too public officials
should not have to avert their senses or their equipment from de-
tecting emissions in the public domain such as excessive heat,
traces of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases, airborne particu-
lates, or radioactive emissions, any of which could identify hazards
69to the community.
Justice Stevens believed the Court did not exercise judicial restraint and
crafted a new rule that encompassed too much, including a dog sniff being
58. Id. at 40.
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29, 31.
62. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
65. Lunney, supra note 41, at 855.
66. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 42 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
68. Id. at 43 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
69. Id. at 45 (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988)).
207
7
Brown: Something Smells Afoul: An Analysis of the End of a District Cour
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
allowed at a home.70 In response to Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion,
Justice Scalia stated, "[t]he Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has
never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained."7  Furthermore, to say the device only picks up the heat coming
from the walls would be to say the eavesdropping device in Katz only picked
up sound waves coming off the phone booth.72 This decision would become
the case most relied upon by opponents of a warrantless dog sniff at a private
residence.73
4. The Clashing of Caballes
The most recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States ad-
dressing a dog sniff is Caballes.74 In this case, the Court held "[a) dog sniff
conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information
other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to pos-
sess does not violate the Fourth Amendment."7 ' The respondent was pulled
over by an officer for speeding, and while the respondent waited in the offic-
er's car, a second officer arrived at the scene and conducted a sniff test with
a narcotics dog that lasted less than ten minutes around the outside of the
respondent's car.76 The Court started off by noting "that a seizure that is
lawful at its inception" can become unlawful by an execution that violates a
protected interest. However, the Court found the dog sniff did not violate
any protected interest because there is no legitimate privacy interest in con-
traband.7 1 "[G]ovemmental conduct that only reveals the possession of con-
traband 'compromises no legitimate privacy interest.'" 79 The Court also ad-
dressed the issue of a false positive by the dog.80 The Court responded to
this contention raised by the respondent by saying that the tests are designed,
70. Id. at 47, 51.
71. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
72. Id. at 35.
73. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S154 (Apr. 14, 2011); Rabb II, 920 So. 2d
1175, 1183 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
74. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
75. Id. at 410.
76. Id. at 406.
77. Id. at 407.
78. Id. at 408.
79. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123
(1984)).
80. Id. at 409.
[Vol. 36208
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if done properly, to only reveal the presence of contraband and no other in-
terests.
The Court recognized the potential misinterpretations by lower courts of
Kyllo as applied to a dog sniff.82 In its opinion, the Court points out that the
central factor in Kyllo was the ability of the technology to detect intimate
details of a home other than contraband. As stated previously, when done
right, a dog sniff only detects the presence of contraband; therefore, the deci-
sion of Caballes is consistent with Kyllo because no intimate details were
invaded.84 However, the dissent believed there was more than a possibility
for a false positive than the majority believed. Justice Souter pointed out
that an erroneous alert is the triggering factor if there is a search that turns up
nothing but intimate details of a person's home.86
When combining these decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States, lower courts have been left at a fork in the road, needing to decide
which path they will take.8 ' Lower courts can follow the general rule for
contraband laid out in the dog sniff cases and in Jacobsen,88 or they can fol-
low the Kyllo decision that "the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the
entrance to the house"' which the Court believes "must be not only firm but
also bright."89
III. FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT CASES
By using the above analyzed decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States, lower courts across the United States have come to varying
conclusions on cases that involve a dog sniff of a private residence. 90 The
State of Florida is no exception to this. 9'
81. Id.
82. See id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-31 (2001)).
83. Id. at 409-10 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38).
84. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
85. See id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting). "Justice Souter documented cases in which
dogs were accepted by a court as reliable with an accuracy rate of 71 %, an error rate of 8%
over a dog's entire career, and an error rate of between 7% and 38%." Lunney, supra note 41,
at 862 n.155 (citations omitted).
86. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87. See Lunney, supra note 41, at 854.
88. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410;
Unite States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
89. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
90. See Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d 1, 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review granted, 3 So. 3d
1246 (Fla. 2009), and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
9 1. See id.
209
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A. The Beginning of a Split
In State v. Griffin (Griffin I),92 the First District Court of Appeal of Flor-
ida held, while a positive alert by a narcotics detection dog in a dog sniff of
the defendant's car was probable cause to search the car, it was not enough to
search his person." However, the court reluctantly held this way.94 The first
district certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida, which stated,
"[w]hether, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a
trained narcotics-detection dog alert of a vehicle provides probable cause to
search the vehicle's driver who is also the sole occupant of the vehicle?"95
The court was required to follow precedent established by Williams v.
State,96 but felt the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Caballes conflicted with the holding of Williams.97 "Our constitution re-
quires us to construe the right to be free from unreasonable searches or sei-
zures 'in conformity with the [Fourth] Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."' 9 The court
certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida because it felt that
Caballes intended for incidences like this to not be searches, but thought that
the Supreme Court of Florida should decide since it is an issue that has not
been analyzed by the highest court yet." The First District Court quoted the
Supreme Court of the United States which stated in Maryland v. Pringle'to
that the "standard of probable cause protects 'citizens from rash and unrea-
sonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,'
while giving 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protec-
tion."' The Supreme Court of Florida denied review on this appeal. 10 2
92. 949 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
93. Id. at 312.
94. See id. at 314.
95. Id. at 315 (emphasis omitted).
96. 911 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
97. Griffin 1, 949 So. 2d at 310. The Williams court held that a positive alert by a drug
detection dog did not allow probable cause to search the suspect's person. Williams, 911 So.
2d at 861. The court based this decision on two Second District Court of Appeal's decisions
that held a dog sniff was not probable cause to conduct a search. Id.
98. Griffin 1, 949 So. 2d at 314 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12).
99. Id. at 310, 314.
100. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
101. Griffin 1, 949 So. 2d at 312 (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370).
102. State v. Griffin (Griffin II), 958 So. 2d 920, 920 (Fla. 2007).
[Vol. 36210
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B. The Controversial Rabb Decision
Like the First District Court in Williams, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal of Florida held a dog sniff for the detection of narcotics of a private
residence from the outside of the home is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment in Rabb 11.103 This court ruled on Rabb twice-on the first appeal and
then on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.'0 The first
decision was vacated and remanded back to the fourth district "for further
consideration in light of . .. [Caballes.]"os The case centers around the dog
sniff of a private residence for a probable cause warrant.106 Information was
gathered from a confidential source that the defendant was cultivating mari-
juana.1 07 The police pulled the defendant over in his car after watching him
leave his home.os Upon pulling him over, the police noticed marijuana cul-
tivation books and videos on his front seat.' 09 The officer performed a dog
sniff on the outside of the defendant's home, and after a positive alert, re-
ceived a probable cause warrant to search the home."o
While the State insisted the warrant was based on the totality of the cir-
cumstances and not just the dog sniff, the district court still did not believe
all the circumstances combined would allow a search of the home."' Fur-
thermore, the court held the dog sniff of a private residence performed on the
doorstep of a person's home is a search under the Fourth Amendment." 2 By
this holding, the court relied on United States v. Thomas' from the Second
Circuit.1 4 As in Kyllo, the court strongly focused on the sanctity of the home
in Anglo-American law."' "[T]he 'physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.""' 6
The court further focused on the holding of Kyllo by analogizing the heat
emanating from the home and the smell of marijuana that reached the ca-
103. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Williams v. State, 911
So. 2d 861, 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
104. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1177.
105. Rabb 1, 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005), substituted by 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
106. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 178.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1179.
111. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1179-80.
112. Id. at 1192.
113. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
114. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1184.
115. Seeid.at1182-83.
116. Id. at 1182 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)).
21 1
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nine's nose on the doorstep.'" In the court's view, the smell of marijuana
originating from the inside of the home was just an intimate a detail as the
heat emanating from the home in Kyllo."'
Because of precedent set by the Supreme Court of the United States and
prior decisions of the Florida district courts of appeal, the fourth district was
forced to distinguish multiple cases that held a dog sniff of the outside of a
private residence was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.' 19 First, the
court distinguished this case from Place.120 While the subject of the dog
sniff in Place was luggage, the court thought that a private residence is very
different both in physical characteristics and in protection granted by law,
especially historically.12' A decision by the Fifth District Court of Appeal of
Florida was slightly harder to overcome.122 Nelson v. State2 3 1involved a dog
sniff in a hotel hallway.124 The court distinguished this case from the one at
hand by stating that a hotel guest expects people to be in the hallways more
than one expects a person to be on the doorstep of his or her private resi-
dence.125
However, the most important distinction the Rabb II court was forced to
make relates to the reason the Supreme Court of the United States re-
manded.126 The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida felt this was dif-
ferent from Caballes because the issue was not a dog sniff performed on a
car, as it was in Caballes, but the issue was a dog sniff performed on a
home.127 Most importantly, the Rabb II court believed that case law is "not
developed in a vacuum."' 2 ' Every case is situation-sensitive.129 As the ma-
jority opinion pointed out, the expectation of privacy is analyzed based on
the place, not the item being retrieved from inside, as the dissent did.'30 Both
of those actions, looking at the expectation of privacy of the item and not
evolving case law as it pertains to special circumstances, will lead to a slip-
pery slope in the majority's view.131
117. Id. at 1183.
118. Id. at 1184-85.
119. Rabb 11, 920 So. 2d at 1185-86.
120. Id. at 1183-84.
121. Id.at1l84.
122. Id. at 1185.
123. 867 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
124. Id. at 535.
125. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1187.
126. See id. at 1189.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1190.
131. Id.
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Believing the majority created a "schizophrenic" law, the dissent had
much to say.13 2 "[B]ecause a house is neither luggage in an airport nor a car
by the side of the road, a dog sniff at the front door of a house is a Fourth
Amendment search." 33 Just as the majority believed the dissent was focus-
ing on the incorrect area, the dissent believed the majority misinterpreted the
turning factor in the decisions of dog sniff cases by the Supreme Court of the
United States.134 "Neither of the Supreme Court's dog sniff cases turns on
the location of the sniff. Both cases are based on the unique nature of the
canine nose."' 35 While the Supreme Court of the United States did state the
place in its ruling, such as luggage or a car, the main reasoning for the Su-
preme Court of the United States in these prior decisions of dog sniff was the
fact that a sniff only discloses the presence of contraband. 3 6 "If the posses-
sion of narcotics in an automobile or a suitcase is illegitimate, so too is the
possession of narcotics in a home."' 3 7 Moving beyond the dog sniff cases
considered by the Supreme Court of the United States, the dissent also
brought up Jacobsen.'3 8 In that case, the Court defined a search as occurring
"when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasona-
ble is infringed." 9 "A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a
particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest
in privacy."l 40 Lastly, the dissent wanted to draw attention to the lack of
critical analysis the majority gave to the Caballes decision.14' The Supreme
Court of the United States distinguished Caballes from Kyllo by focusing on
the fact that the thermal-imaging device could detect lawful activity.14 2 As
stated before by the Court in the federal dog sniff cases, a drug detection dog
does not detect lawful activity-it only detects the unlawful possession of
contraband. 143
132. Id. at 1203 (Gross, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1193.
134. Id. at 1197.
135. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 193.
136. See id.
137. Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
138. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1197 (Gross, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
139. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
140. Id. at 123.
141. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1199 (Gross, J., dissenting).
142. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 35-36 (2001)).
143. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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C. Post-Rabb Decision
The different outcome in Rabb II incited another certified question to be
sent to the Supreme Court of Florida.'" The First District Court of Appeal of
Florida certified a conflict with Rabb II in Stabler v. State.145 In Stabler,
officers initiated a surveillance based on a tip and followed the suspect as he
was leaving his home.'" Upon stopping the suspect in his car, the officers
performed a dog sniff around the exterior of the car, whereupon a bottle of
liquid codeine was found.147  At the same time, officers at the suspect's
girlfriend's home had a detection dog sniff the outside of the home from the
front door of the apartment.'4 8 The dog alerted positively to the presence of
narcotics in the private residence.149 Based on these two happenings, the
officers obtained a probable cause search warrant and physically searched
the home.150 The deference given to the dog sniff cases decided upon by the
Supreme Court of the United States and by the court in Stabler was much
greater than that of the court in Rabb II.'5 ' The court stated, "[c]onsidering
that Caballes and Place represent the only two cases in which the Court has
endeavored to address the dog sniff issue, the reasoning espoused therein is
controlling and must guide this Court's ruling in th[is] instant case." 5 2 Also,
the court did not believe Kyllo was a controlling factor.'53 "'Critical to that
decision was the fact that the device was [also] capable of detecting lawful
activity ....
These cases represent an established pattern in the appellate courts of
Florida.'"' These cases represent two sides that interpreted very binding and
valid precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States.156
144. See Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
145. 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at
1192).
146. Id. at 1258-59.
147. Id. at 1259.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Stabler, 990 So. 2d at 1259.
151. Compare id. at 1261 with Rabb II, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1184 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
152. Stabler, 990 So. 2d at 1260.
153. See id. at 1261-62.
154. Id. at 1261 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)) (alteration in
original).
155. See id.; Griffin I, 949 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Rabb II, 920 So.
2d at 1192.
156. See Griffin I, 949 So. 2d at315; Rabb II, 920 So. 2d at 1192.
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Eventually, these views would come head to head and a winner would be
chosen-at least a winner in the State of Florida.157
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA AND JARDINES
Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida accepted a certified conflict.'
This time it was between Rabb II and State v. Jardines (Jardines I).19
A. The District Court Decision
In Jardines I, a crime stoppers tip led two police officers to approach
the defendant's door.) When the officers stood at the door, they noticed the
air conditioner was continuously running.' 6 ' A drug detection dog, which
was "positively alerted to the odor of narcotics approximately 399 times" in
his career, was alerted to the presence of narcotics from the front door.16 2 In
his defense, the defendant relied on Rabb I. 163
The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida held that "a canine sniff is
not a Fourth Amendment search."'64 The court relied on Caballes and Place
to come to this usual conclusion.165 Furthermore, the court utilized the rea-
soning from Jacobsen.'66 Because a dog only detects contraband and be-
cause there is no "'legitimate' privacy interest in contraband," a canine sniff
is not a Fourth Amendment search.167 Because Kyllo is the case most cited
by courts that find a dog sniff of a private residence is a search, the district
court needed to explain why it found it to not apply to the dog sniff of a
home.'6 8 The court first began by stating that a dog is not technology-it has
no modifications.16 That is why the Supreme Court of the United States
described dogs as sui generis.70 As contrasted to the thermal imager in Kyl-
157. See Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
158. Jardines v. State (Jardines II), 3 So. 3d 1246, 1246 (Fla. 2009), quashed by 36 Fla. L.
Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
159. 9 So. 3d I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review granted, 3 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2009),
and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
160. Id. at 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 4.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).
168. See id. at 5.
169. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 5.
170. Id.
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lo, a dog sniff "does not indiscriminately detect legal activity." 7 ' "Just as
evidence in the plain view of officers may be searched without a warrant,172
evidence in the plain smell may be detected without a warrant."1 73 Further-
more, in order to use this plain smell doctrine, the officer and the dog must
be there lawfully.174 The court addressed this by citing, "one does not harbor
an expectation of privacy on a front porch where salesmen or visitor may
appear at any time." 75
Judge Cope wrote an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in
part.17 6 He gave a different take on the dog sniff of a private residence that
not many have considered in the discussion. 177 He believed the court should
hold that a dog sniff can be performed "if there is a reasonable suspicion of
drug activity." 78 Most courts that hold that a dog sniff of a private residence
is a search require probable cause.179 Judge Cope dictated three schools of
thought on the issue of a dog sniff of a home. 8 0 The first school of thought
holds in accord with the general idea given by the Supreme Court of the
United States: a dog sniff of a private residence is not a search.' 8 ' Logically,
a search warrant is not required. 82 The second school of thought is the evi-
dent counterpart of the first-the government must have a probable cause
warrant in order to perform a dog sniff from the outside of a private resi-
dence.83 The last category is somewhere in the middle.'" Rather than prob-
able cause, an officer only needs reasonable, articulable suspicion in order to
perform the dog sniff of a private residence from the front door step.'85 This
idea centers on the idea that "a free society will not remain free if police may
use this, or any other crime detection device, at random and without rea-
son." 86 This is the position that Judge Cope advocated.'87 He finished by
171. Id.
172. Id. at 6 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam)).
173. Id. (citing United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1363 (8th Cir. 1992) (per cu-
riam)).
174. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 6 (quoting People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2008)).
175. Id. at 7 (quoting State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1981)).
176. Id. at 10 (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. See id. at 12.
178. Id. at 10.
179. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d at 12 (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. Id. at 12-13.
181. Id. at 12.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Jardines I, 9 So. 3d at 12-13.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Id.
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adding, "[w]hile the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court
has no precedential effect, it certainly indicates that the Court has decided to
leave this dog sniff question open for decision another day."' 88
B. The Supreme Court Decision
This decision was expressly overruled by the Supreme Court of Flori-
da.189 The court addressed two issues when deciding Jardines Ill. 90 First,
"whether a 'sniff test' by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door of
a private residence is a 'search' under the Fourth Amendment." 9' Second,
"whether the evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the government must
make prior to conducting such a search is probable cause or reasonable sus-
picion." 9 2 The court answered the first question with a resounding yes.' 93
Given the special status accorded a citizen's home under the
Fourth Amendment, we conclude that a "sniff test", such as the
test that was conducted in the present case, is a substantial gov-
ernment intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.' 94
The court focused its discussion on the home and the privacy it should
be afforded.' 95 "[W]herever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expecta-
tion of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government in-
trusion."l 96 After analyzing the federal drug sniff cases-Place, City of Indi-
anapolis v. Edmond,'9 ' and Caballes-the court concluded those instances
were less intrusive than the case at hand.' 98 The sniffs in the previous cases
involved luggage or a car, whereas a home was more special to this court.199
More importantly to the court, the majority opinion believed the case at hand
created more of a public spectacle and caused more harassment and embar-
187. Id. at 10.
188. Id. at 14 (Cope, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at S154.
194. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S152.
195. See id. at S150.
196. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
197. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
198. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S150.
199. Id.
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rassment to the suspect than the previous federal cases. 2' The court believed
the situation was a much larger affair than a "subtle" sniff test.201 The court
listed the players involved to fabricate the drama: multiple police vehicles,
multiple law enforcement personnel, a dog handler, and a trained detection
dog "engaged in a vigorous search effort on the front porch," all viewed by
the general public. 20 2 The court further commented on the whole scene by
adding that if the resident were home, the sniff could be a "frightening and
harrowing experience that could prompt a reflexive or unpredictable re-
sponse."203 Above all, the court did not believe that the prior decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States that involved dog sniffs applied to a
sniff at a home.20
What the Supreme Court of Florida was most worried about was police
abuse of a dog sniff.205 The court felt that if the sniff was not treated as a
search then there would be "nothing to prevent the agents from applying the
procedure in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or based on whim and
fancy, at the home of any citizen."206 Therefore, the court believed that a
warrant should be required to perform a dog sniff of a private residence from
the front door.207 "'With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless
search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered
no."' 20 8 Furthermore, anything short of a probable cause warrant would not
suffice for the highest court of Florida.2 0 As opposed to Justice Cope's opi-
nion in the lower court's decision,2 10 the majority did not think reasonable
suspicion is enough. 21 l The court pointed to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment and said a balancing of interests-governmental and
private-for reasonable suspicion is only used when there are needs that go
200. Id. at S152.
201. See id. at S150-51.
202. Id. at S151-52.
203. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S 152.
204. Id. at S150.
205. See id. at S152.
206. Id.
207. Id. at S153. Lunney thinks this is the right choice and further combats naysayers by
pointing out that it does not conflict with the idea that having probable cause would defeat the
purpose of the dog sniff and lead straight to a search of the home. Lunney, supra note 41, at
891. Rather, the probable cause is for the dog sniff, not the physical search inside the private
residence. See id.
208. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S152 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
31 (2001)).
209. See id. at S153.
210. Jardines 1, 9 So. 3d 1, 10 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review granted, 3 So. 3d
1246 (Fla. 2009), and quashed by 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147 (Apr. 14, 2011).
211. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S153.
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beyond the typical law enforcement.2 12 By citing to the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment, the court is saying this is a search and nothing
less. 213
The concurring opinion written by Justice Lewis takes the majority opi-
nion one step further.2t 4 He believed the court did not focus on the home
enough. 215 He continued by poking fun at the idea that the police officers
could use a continuously running air conditioner as a factor for reasonable
suspicion by stating that most persons in South Florida run their air conti-
nuously. 2 16 Furthermore, he analogized the aromas a dog could potentially
sniff with the intimate details the thermal imaging device in Kyllo could
detect.217 There is the aroma of cooking, a scent from an air freshener, and
even more unpleasant smells originating inside a home. 2 18 "[I]t is inescapa-
ble that the air and the content of the air within the private home is inextrica-
bly interwoven as part of the protected zone of privacy to which the expecta-
tion of privacy attaches."219 While the majority opinion did not focus on the
intimate details of the home, Justice Lewis thought this should have been
emphasized more.220
As the courts before that relied on the dog sniff cases by the Supreme
Court of the United States, so too did the dissenting opinion in this
groundbreaking case from the Supreme Court of Florida.22 1 "[D]espite
statements about privacy interests in items and odors within and escaping
from a home, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that there are no
legitimate privacy interests in contraband under the Fourth Amendment." 2 22
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Polston lays out two reasons why his view
is correct, and these two reasons are rules set out by the Supreme Court of
the United States. 223 First, a search does not occur "unless 'the [person] ma-
nifested a subjective expectation of privacy."' 2 24 Second, and lastly, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that, "because [a dog sniff] only
212. Id.
213. See id. at S152.
214. Id. at S154 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).
215. Id. at Sl55.
216. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S 155.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S157 (Polston, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at Sl57.
223. Id. at Sl58.
224. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)).
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reveals contraband, . . . there is no legitimate privacy interest" that can be
infringed upon.225
Justice Polston addresses the issue of a dog sniff detecting legitimate in-
terests or even alerting a false positive by saying, "'as in Place, the likelih-
ood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will actually
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to
characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment."' 2 26
Along this line, Justice Polston distinguished Kyllo from the situation at
hand. 227 The Supreme Court of the United States held in Kyllo that the ther-
mal imager was a search under the Fourth Amendment, because it detected
lawful activity that does have a legitimate privacy interest.228 Furthermore,
even though Kyllo is the case relied upon by courts finding a dog sniff is a
search, this dissenting opinion reasons that the dog sniff of a private resi-
dence does not matter.22 9 Neither Jacobsen, Place, nor Caballes center on
what was being searched, such as the luggage or the car.230 The cases center
on the capability of the dog to detect only a contraband item in which a per-
son has no legitimate interest. 231 Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United
States specifically distinguished Kyllo in Caballes as a case that involved a
home, so that the dog sniff would not be applied to that as Justice Stevens
worried in Kyllo.232 It is precisely these two different views of decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States that lead to varying outcomes which
may not be in accord with what the Supreme Court of the United States
would choose.233
V. ISSUES ARISING FROM JARDINES
According to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, the Su-
preme Court of Florida is allowed to grant higher protection in the absence of
a precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States that is
225. Id.
226. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S158 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 124 (1984)).
227. Id.atSl59.
228. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
229. See Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S159 (Polston, J., dissenting).
230. See id. at S157. Justice Polston also addresses the humiliation issue that the majority
felt was a major part of its decision. Id. at S159. "Place, Edmond, and Caballes all involved
law enforcement activity by multiple officers." Id.
231. Id.
232. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
233. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S154, S159 (Polston, J., dissenting).
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directly on point to the contrary. 23 Some states have extended protection to
citizens in their homes beyond that of the Fourth Amendment because these
states' constitutions allow them to do that.235
The Rabb court could not avoid the issue as other courts had by
declaring that the state constitution provided greater protection
than the United States Constitution. Article I, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution, which provides Florida citizens the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, also states sec-
tion 12 "shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment
of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court." . . . The Rabb court focused its analysis on
distinguishing Caballes from Kyllo and explaining why Kyllo was
more applicable to the case at bar.236
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida can only ignore precedent es-
tablished by the Supreme Court of the United States when the precedent is
contrary to the case at hand.237 The Supreme Court of Florida, in Jardines
III, tried to do just that-first, by stating that neither Caballes nor Place in-
volved dog sniffs of a home, and second, by stating that Kyllo's use of a
thermal imager is more on point because it involved a home.238
A. Kyllo Should Not be Applied to the "Dog Sniff" Cases
Kyllo is not the proper case to be used for comparison to the dog sniff of
a home. 23 9 The use of the thermal imager in Kyllo was a search under the
Fourth Amendment because the device revealed intimate details of a home
other than the illegitimate interest from the heat produced by the growing
lamps.240 While the concurring opinion in Jardines III tried to take the fact
234. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
235. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 336. For example, Indiana's constitution has the same
written language as the Fourth Amendment, but an appeals court of Indiana has interpreted its
constitution as allowing greater protection. Id. The court states the highest court of Indiana
'explicitly rejected the expectation of privacy as a test of the reasonableness of a search or
seizure."' Id. (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005)). In this case, the
greater protection is treating a dog sniff of a private residence from the front porch of the
home as a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
236. Id. at 341-42 (quoting FLA. CONST. art I, § 12).
237. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 341.
238. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S 150.
239. Id. at S159 (Polston, J., dissenting).
240. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (citing Kyllo v. United States 533
U.S. 27, 38 (2001)).
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that a dog can smell the presence of other items in a home, such as air fre-
sheners or cooking, Justice Lewis failed to remember one thing: this is a
dog."' The heat that was intimate in the home in Kyllo was revealed to a
person.242 A person had to evaluate the heat scan to determine if there was
extra heat radiating from the home.243 The person who must read the scan is
invading a privacy interest, whereas when a dog is detecting the intimate
smells of a home, it is not telling a human: They are baking an apple pie in
there.2'
The rule established by the Kyllo court should be considered when de-
ciding if Kyllo should be applied to a dog sniff performed at a private resi-
dence. 245 "Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in gener-
al public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." 24 6 This standard raises mul-
tiple issues. 247 First, is a dog technology?24 8 Second, would a dog sniff be
considered a physical intrusion? 249 Third, is a narcotics detection dog consi-
dered in "general public use"? 250 The first and last questions can be consi-
dered similarly. 25 1 Dogs have been used throughout history for hundreds of
years.2 52 However, Leslie Lunney cites to the White House's Office of Na-
tional Drug Control Policy, which lists detection dogs as "Non-Intrusive
Technology."253 While this may seem to create conflict, the focus then
should be on the non-intrusive part of the title, which leads to the second
254 TeJriquestion. The Jardines III court relied on this language in Kyllo to relate
241. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S155 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).
242. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
243. See id. at 30. The federal agent was the person to conclude that Kyllo was using heat
to grow marijuana in his home. Id.
244. Id.; see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating a dog only detects
the presence of contraband).
245. Lunney, supra note 41, at 898-900.
246. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
247. Lunney, supra note 41, at 893, 898-900.
248. Id. at 893.
249. Id. at 898.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 897.
252. See Debruler v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Ky. 2007).
253. Lunney, supra note 41, at 893 (citing THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY: COUNTERDRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BLUEPRINT UPDATE, at C-1 (2002),
available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=343 1.
254. Id. (stating this would create a problem for an attorney general who is arguing the
dog is not technology when the White House labels it as such).
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the dog sniff of the private residence to the use of the thermal imager.255 The
Supreme Court of Florida stated that the information gathered by the dog
sniff could not have otherwise been obtained without physical intrusion.256
On the other hand, the Place court called the act of a dog sniff less intrusive
than a physical search because a dog sniff does not require the opening of a
car door.m Just the same, neither would the dog sniff of a home require the
opening of a door.258
B. Caballes as the Controlling Precedent for "Dog Sniff' Cases
Furthermore, Caballes addressed the issue of a false positive, which
would reveal to humans a privacy interest that should have been protected.259
The Supreme Court of the United States pointed out that when done right, a
dog sniff should not jeopardize any privacy interests in a home. 2 60 This
seems to say the Court recognized that there is a potential, but that it is too
remote.261 In the same opinion, Justice Stevens responded to the false posi-
tive argument raised by the respondent by stating that a false positive does
not, in and of itself, reveal any legitimate privacy interest.26 2 While some
may read this as completely discarding the issue of a false positive,263 this is
probably not what Justice Stevens was hinting at.26 Justice Stevens was not
saying a false positive does not reveal any legitimate interests because clear-
ly, it would.265 What Justice Stevens was probably implicating is the fact that
the physical intrusion will actually be the cause of invasion of a legitimate
interest, rather than the dog sniff.26 6
Some have criticized the Caballes court for going "beyond what was
strictly necessary" by explaining "why the Caballes decision was 'entirely
consistent with' Kyllo." 267 MacDonnell believes that the majority in Ca-
balles changed the meaning of Kyllo from the home being protected to what
255. Jardines III, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S147, S149 (Apr. 14, 2011) (citing Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001)).
256. Id. at S150.
257. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
258. See Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S151.
259. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
260. Id.
261. See id.; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984).
262. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
263. See Lunney, supra note 41, at 871 (calling this an "artificial conclusion").
264. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. MacDonnell, supra note 21, at 316 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409).
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is being protected-or not, in the dog sniff case.268 However, the distinction
between Caballes and Kyllo could be seen as directly in accord with other
previous decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States.269 In Cal or-
nia v. Ciraolo,27 0 the Court stated, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of
the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares." 27 1 Just
as an officer need not close his eyes when he is approaching a home, he need
not block his other senses, such as smell.272 While some believe that a nar-
cotics dog should not be equated to an officer, dogs have been used in law
enforcement since the constitution was created.273
Furthermore, the protection of the Fourth Amendment allows "the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."274 Similarly, the rule from Justice Harlan's concur-
ring opinion in Katz asks whether the person has a reasonable subjective
expectation of privacy.2 75 Both of these statements from the Supreme Court
of the United States involve a reasonable expectation.2 76 The Court has held
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.277 There-
fore, a person should have no expectation of privacy in respect to contra-
band, even if that item is located within a private residence.278 Protectors of
the home worry that allowing a dog sniff of a home will allow officers to
begin arbitrarily sniffing anytime at any home. 279 However, while Anglo-
American law may afford the home more protection, it does not afford that
protection to contraband.280
The Supreme Court of the United States even remanded a case back to
the Supreme Court of Florida in light of its decision in Caballes.28 1 The Su-
preme Court of the United States reviewed a decision by an appellate court
268. Id. at 317.
269. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
270. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
271. Id. at 213, 215 (holding that aerial surveillance is not a search).
272. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 45 (2001) (quoting California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 41(1988)).
273. See Debruler v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Ky. 2007).
274. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
275. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), superseded
by statute, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
276. Id.; see also Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511.
277. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
278. Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989, 1031 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
279. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S 147, S147 (Apr. 14,2011).
280. Id.; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
281. Rabb 1, 544 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2005), substituted by 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
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of Florida on the issue of a dog sniff of a private residence and remanded it
back to the appeals court in order for the Florida court to reevaluate the deci-
sion.282 If the Supreme Court of the United States felt like it was the right
decision, it probably would not have remanded the case back to be reeva-
luated. The Rabb II court distinguished the two cases by stating that Rabb I
did not involve a dog sniff of a car.28' By stating this, it seems to imply that
the Supreme Court of the United States did not read the issue before it. 28
Kyllo was before Caballes; if the Supreme Court of the United States wanted
Kyllo to apply to Caballes, the Court would have explained that.28" After
quickly dismissing Caballes, the Rabb II court then relied on another cir-
286cuit's opinion, a case by the Supreme Court of the United States, not in-
volving a dog sniff, 287 and a dissenting opinion from Caballes,28 8 instead of
the majority opinion that the Supreme Court of the United States was intend-
ing the Florida court to reconsider.289
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that a dog sniff performed on a
private residence from the front step is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Florida Constitution. 29 According to the Florida Constitution,
the highest court of Florida is allowed to make decisions in the absence of
precedent to the contrary by the Supreme Court of the United States. 291 Feel-
ing that none of the federal "dog sniff' cases pertained directly to a private
residence, the Supreme Court of Florida made an unprecedented decision in
the theater of the Fourth Amendment. 292
However, by focusing so strongly on the importance of the privacy of a
home, the Supreme Court of Florida, overlooked-and noticeably ignored-
282. Id.
283. Rabb II, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
284. See id.; Rabb I, 544 U.S. at 1028.
285. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
286. United States. v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985). The second circuit is the
only federal circuit to decide that a dog sniff of a home from the outside is a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Lunney, supra note 41, at 887-88. The seventh circuit criticized Tho-
mas by pointing out that even if Thomas had a subjective expectation of privacy, society is not
ready to consider that expectation to be reasonable in contraband. United States v. Brock, 417
F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 762 (2009).
287. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
288. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
289. Rabb I, 544 U.S. at 1028.
290. Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly S 147, S154 (Apr. 14, 2011).
291. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
292. See Jardines 111, 36 Fla. L. Weekly at S152.
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the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States that a person has no
legitimate privacy interest in contraband.293 Still, as long as there is no bind-
ing decision by the highest court of this nation on a case involving a dog
sniff of a private residence, the Supreme Court of Florida's decision will
stand in its jurisdiction.29 4
293. Id.; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
294. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
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